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Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in Libor Submissions
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Abstract
Interbanking rates were, until recently, based on judgmental estimates of borrowing
costs. We interpret this as a cheap talk game that allowed banks to communicate non
verifiable information about their opportunity cost to potential counterparties. Under
normal market conditions there is a welfare maximizing equilibrium where banks truthfully
disclose their borrowing cost, but, in times of financial stress, only “coarse” equilibria
survive. We take this prediction to the data and show that banks round more frequently
if the risk of the bank increases. Rounding is also more frequent for the more liquid short
term rates and certain benchmark maturities.
Key Words: Interbank market, Interest rate fixings, Libor, Cheap Talk, Search Frictions.
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1 Introduction
Interest rate benchmarks play a key role in financial markets. The most widely used, the
London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), served as a reference in contracts with notional values
estimated to amount to up to ✩800 trillion (Wheatley, 2012). Surprisingly, Libor, before its
reform in 2013, was determined with a mechanism resembling an informal daily opinion poll:
The British Banker’s Association (BBA) asked a panel of banks to submit the rate at which
they could potentially borrow in the interbank market and the Libor rate was calculated as
the interquartile mean of these submissions. In this mechanism, the banks seem to have had a
high level of discretion.1
In this paper, we demonstrate that, even if misrepresentation is not penalized, banks will
have incentives to honestly report their borrowing rates if certain conditions hold.2 This not
only explains why this surprisingly informal mechanism largely performed well and allowed
Libor to become a widely followed benchmark, but also shows why it failed when these con-
ditions did not hold any more in the unfolding of the financial crisis between 2008 and 2011.
Our model also predicts a number of patterns in the precision of the banks’ submissions that
can be identified in the data and seem difficult to explain otherwise.
We exploit a specific feature of the Libor mechanism: Until April 2013, the BBA not only
published the benchmark rate, i.e. the interquartile mean, but also each bank’s individual
submissions (see ICE Benchmark Administration, 2016). These individual submissions seem to
1Concretely banks in the Libor panel were asked the question: “At what rate could you borrow funds,
were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior
to 11am London time?” (Duffie and Stein, 2015). Note that there is no definition of “reasonable market
size” and that banks can submit estimates even if they have not “asked for” or accepted interbank offers.
The BBA further specifies in its provisions that: “Therefore, submissions are based upon the lowest perceived
rate at which it could go into the London interbank market and obtain funding in reasonable market size, for
a given maturity and currency. BBA Libor is not necessarily based on actual transactions.” (UK House of
Commons, 2012) Not surprisingly, in the recent lawsuits, it has turned out to be very difficult to prove that
banks were providing wrong answers to this question. Instead, courts based their convictions on seized in-
ternal communication that demonstrated that banks were conspiring to manipulate the outcome of the rate
setting mechanism.
2Our findings can also be rationalized in a setting with verifiable reports if the cost of lying is sufficiently
small. We explain why in Footnote 14.
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have conveyed crucial information3 about a bank’s borrowing cost to potential counterparties
in the opaque, phone-brokered interbank market.4
Building on Kim and Kircher (2015), we model this setting as a search market where indi-
vidual cheap talk reports emitted by banks guide counterparties seeking to lend to one of these
banks. Under normal conditions, truthful reporting is an equilibrium. When a bank under-
states its true borrowing costs, potential counterparties expect lower gains from trade and thus
submit fewer offers to this bank, which, not surprisingly, reduces its profits. On the contrary,
overstating true borrowing costs attracts more offers, but in the model of Kim and Kircher
(2015), these additional offers turn out to be at rates that are too high to be attractive for the
bank. This truth revealing equilibrium also maximizes welfare, as the increased transparency
leads to a better matching of borrowers and lenders.
Unfortunately, this equilibrium is upset when there is uncertainty about the bank’s financial
health such as in the financial crisis between 2008 and 2011. In this case, high individual
borrowing costs may not only reflect short term liquidity needs but also indicate a possible
risk of failure.5 This creates incentives to understate the true borrowing cost.6 As in the
canonical cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982), these incentives to misstate the
truth limit the precision of information that can be transmitted in equilibrium. The reason for
this result is straightforward: Banks can no longer credibly disclose their precise borrowing costs
because in any truth revealing equilibrium they would have incentives to slightly understate
3Ridley and Jones (2012) cite a banking official “recalling the intense scrutiny as soon as Libor rates were
published at 11 a.m. ‘Trading rooms would be watching and dissecting what rates people had been putting in
each day, looking for a major change in behavior.’ ”
4See MacKenzie (2008) for a description of the functioning of the market.
5For instance, the specialized press writes: “The Libor setting process is public and closely watched, so
a bank that put in relatively high rate estimates could spark investor concern about its strength.” Financial
Times, Feb. 9, 2012 (Probe Reveals Scale of Libor Abuse). The Wheatley Review states that “While individ-
ual submissions reflect elements other than solely idiosyncratic counterparty credit risk, changes in a particu-
lar bank’s submission may be interpreted by some observers as an implicit signal as to the creditworthiness of
that contributor.”(Wheatley, 2012)
6Again, we have direct evidence for the existence of these incentives. For example, in a recorded elec-
tronic chat on September 26, 2008 an HBOS submitter wrote to an employee of another financial institu-
tion “youll like this ive been pressured by senior management to bring my rates down into line with everyone
else.”(CFTC, 2014). For more evidence see also CFTC (2012), page 19 ff.
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their true costs. However, if the signal space is partitioned into sufficiently large intervals, a
small deviation from the truth is not possible. As large deviations remain unprofitable, with a
coarse signal space there exists an equilibrium where banks truthfully indicate the interval in
which their borrowing costs are situated.
In our model, the coarseness of the signal space, i.e. the size of these intervals, will depend
on two factors. One is uncertainty about the bank’s default probability: The more a bank
needs to demonstrate that it is healthy, the stronger are its incentives to understate its true
borrowing cost and thus the less precise is the information that can be credibly transmitted in
the cheap talk equilibrium. A second, less straightforward and more surprising factor is market
liquidity: If there are many potential lenders, they compete more fiercely and thus submit, on
average, lower quotes. Thus, a deviation that sheds away the high quotes is less costly for the
bank. Finally, note that the two effects reinforce each other: In the absence of uncertainty,
there is a fully revealing equilibrium independently of the liquidity of the interbank market
and hence no liquidity effect, but with increasing risk, liquidity will have a stronger effect on
coarseness.
We take these hypotheses to the data and show that our model can explain a number of
so far undocumented patterns in the precision of the Libor submissions. Similar to Backus,
Blake, and Tadelis (2019) we interpret rounding as a natural way to partition the signal space
into intervals of a certain size and implement the coarse equilibria predicted by the cheap talk
model. An increase in the frequency of rounded numbers during times of uncertainty then
corresponds to a lower informational content of the reports. We use the banks’ 1-year Credit
Default Swap (CDS) spreads7 as measure of the banks’ financial health and demonstrate that
the banks’ use of rounding increases with this measure of risk. The data also confirm our second
and third prediction: Rounding increases with liquidity and this effect becomes stronger with
higher risk. In particular, rounding is more common for the shorter, more liquid maturities as
7A CDS is an insurance contract against default risk. A company’s CDS spread corresponds to the annual
per dollar price of insuring this company’s debt.
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well as for certain frequently traded reference tenors. If rounding was simply the consequence
of uncertainty about market conditions, we would expect to see less, not more, rounding for
liquid maturities.
Note, that our paper entirely focuses on the banks’ “signaling” (Gandhi, Golez, Jackwerth,
and Plazzi, 2019) or “reputational” (Youle, 2014) concerns, i.e. their incentives to underreport
their borrowing costs to appear less risky. The alleged “Libor suppression” (Libor I, 2013)
resulting from these incentives was the original source of concerns about the Libor (Mollenkamp
and Whitehouse, 2008).
In contrast, almost all of the Libor related lawsuits as well as much of the academic literature
focus on a second, different issue. They analyze the banks’ incentives to manipulate the final
Libor benchmark in order to benefit the bank’s trading portfolio. The legal literature refers
to this as “trader-based manipulations” (Libor VI, 2016), motivated by “cash flow” (Gandhi,
Golez, Jackwerth, and Plazzi, 2019) or “portfolio” incentives (Youle, 2014).
We argue that “trader-base manipulations” are orthogonal to our findings and can be treated
as noise in our empirical analysis: First, the communications between traders and submitters
seized during the different investigations only mention longer maturities such as the 1 month, 3
month or 6 month tenors, which are used as reference rates for loan and derivative contracts, but
not the short rates such as the overnight and one week rates for which rounding is particularly
strong.8 Note also that when traders and submitters discuss numbers, these are almost never
rounded.9 In addition, while “trader-based manipulations” were relatively common, overall only
a comparatively low fraction of the total submissions seems to have been affected. For example,
8To the best of our knowledge, there are no financial contracts that are directly indexed to the very short
term Libor rates. The only derivatives that depend on overnight rates are Overnight Index Swaps (OIS), but
the standard reference rate used in these contracts is the fed funds rate not the overnight Libor. We therefore
think that it is unlikely that banks’ trading portfolios have a strong exposure to the overnight and one week
Libor rates.
9For example in March 16, 2006, a Barclays submitter replies to a swaps trader’s request for a high one-
month and low three-month US Dollar Libor as follows “For you ... anything. I am going to go 78 and 92.5
[basis points]. It is difficult to go lower than that in threes looking at where cash is trading. In fact, if you
did not want a low one I would have gone 93 at least.” (CFTC, 2012)
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the Financial Services Authority (2012) reports that at Barclays, one of the most notorious
manipulators, “between January 2005 and May 2009, at least 173 requests for US dollar Libor
submissions were made to Barclays Submitters“.10 This corresponds to only 1% of the total
number of submissions made during this period.11 Finally, “reputational manipulation” and
“trader-based manipulations” seem to have happened at different periods. Snider and Youle
(2014) demonstrate that “trader-based manipulations” will result in the bunching of quotes
around the first and third quartiles. They find evidence for “bunching” but show that this
behavior disappears in times of high stress, exactly when the rounding behavior documented
in this paper is strongest.
The shortcomings of Libor have given rise to a recent literature on benchmark setting
mechanisms and their design: Abrantes-Metz and Evans (2012), Duffie, Skeie, and Vickery
(2013), Chen (2013), Diehl (2013), Duffie and Dworczak (2014), Duffie and Dworczak (2014),
Hou and Skeie (2014), Duffie and Stein (2015), Coulter, Shapiro, and Zimmerman (2018), Eisl,
Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2017), Duffie, Dworczak, and Zhu (2017) and Gandhi, Golez,
Jackwerth, and Plazzi (2019). This literature largely focuses on mechanisms that would prevent
future “trader-based manipulation”. The gist of this literature is that incentives to manipulate
a benchmark can only be countered by tying submissions closely to verifiable transactions and
introducing explicit incentives to tell the truth.12
In contrast to these papers, our paper demonstrates that, under certain circumstances, even
a benchmark based on non-verifiable, judgmental submissions can generate a reliable indicator
of market conditions. We also show that this type of benchmark will improve the functioning
10In this count a request for example for a high 3 month and low 6 month rate would be counted as two
requests and a request for high or low submissions which did not specify a particular maturity would be
counted as three requests (for one month, three month and six month submissions) unless the context of the
communication indicates otherwise.
11Banks submit daily reports for 15 different maturities, which results in 17265 submissions for the 1150
trading days between January 2005 and May 2009.
12These insights have been taken into account in the new design of the Libor mechanism which is largely
based on verifiable market information, although ICE, the current administrator of Libor has maintained
the possibility of submitting estimates that are not based on market transactions, if no other information is
available.
6
of illiquid and otherwise opaque “over the counter” (OTC) search markets. In this sense, our
paper is complementary to Duffie, Dworczak, and Zhu (2017), who have first demonstrated
how benchmarks can improve the efficiency of OTC markets. The difference though is that
Duffie, Dworczak, and Zhu (2017) focus on the information conveyed by the final Libor rate,
not the individual submissions, as in our model. More generally, our paper also contributes to
a fast growing literature on the implications of search frictions in the interbank market: Ennis
and Weinberg (2013), Afonso and Lagos (2015a), Afonso and Lagos (2015b), Bech and Monnet
(2016).
Obviously, our results do not imply that the original design of the Libor mechanism is still
adequate today. In a world with large and liquid markets for bank funding, it does not make
sense to base such a benchmark on a cheap talk equilibrium, in particular if the benchmark
is used as basis for other financial contracts. However, a judgmental, “cheap talk” mechanism
might have been the only possibility to generate a benchmark in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
when interbank markets were barely developed (MacKenzie, 2008; O’Malley, 2014). Thus,
Libor’s setup was likely not flawed from the outset, but, although clearly inadequate now,
may well have contributed to the spectacular evolution of the interbank market by improving
transparency and liquidity in the early days. Similar mechanisms might be appropriate even
today to support the development of other illiquid markets.
The evidence developed in this paper might also have consequences for the ongoing Libor
lawsuits.13 Price stability is generally considered a sign of collusion and the stability of the
Libor quotes together with bunching of the quotes around certain rates has been cited as
evidence for cartelized behavior (Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz, and Seow, 2012). Our paper
indicates that at least part of this price stability might rather be the result of a strategic choice
of signal precision. Note, however, that our paper does not allow us to draw conclusions about
the suppression of Libor. In cheap talk models there is no specific anchoring of the signal
13See, e.g. Worstall (2017) and Dye (2017).
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and therefore, even in a truth telling equilibrium, the signal does not need to correspond to
the underlying parameters. For example, a submission strategy that prescribes “submit your
borrowing cost minus 20 basis points” qualifies as a fully revealing equilibrium, if the receiver
of the signal is aware of this bias. In fact, this type of strategy might be a reasonably good
description of what happened during 2008-2009, when almost all panel banks are alleged to
have systematically understated their true financing costs (Binham and Thompson, 2017).14
Our empirical part is related to the growing literature analyzing the statistical properties of
Libor submissions, but our paper differs in several aspects from much of this literature. Existing
studies have largely focused on identifying specific patterns of co-movements or differences
between the Libor submissions and other measures of borrowing costs (Abrantes-Metz, Kraten,
Metz, and Seow, 2012; Kuo, Skeie, and Vickery, 2012; Monticini and Thornton, 2013; Fouquau
and Spieser, 2015; Bariviera, Guercio, and Martinez, 2015). An exception is Abrantes-Metz,
Villas-Boas, and Judge (2011) and Rauch, Goettsche, and Mouaaouy (2013) who analyze the
distribution of digits using Benford’s law and observe strong anomalies that are consistent with
our findings. They have, however, neither explained the origin of these anomalies nor uncovered
the pattern of rounding that we document in this paper.
Rounding has also been the focus of a number of papers in the accounting literature that
provide an alternative motivation (Herrmann and Thomas, 2005; Dechow and You, 2012).
These papers show that rounding can be related to a lack of information: For example financial
analysts who spend less effort produce more rounded forecasts. We don’t think that this can
explain our finding, though. In particular, this is not consistent with the fact that rounding is
more common for the shorter, and thus more liquid, maturities, for which information is more
14Our model could be modified to incorporate such predictions by including a direct cost of misreporting
as modelled by Chen (2013). In his model, as the cost of misreporting goes to zero the reports tend to mi-
nus infinity. Obviously, this is only possible because Chen does not put any restriction on the reported rates.
In reality, however, one may expect that banks cannot report arbitrarily low rates. If one adds this as a con-
straint, we expect that the only equilibrium displays pooling at the lowest feasible rate when the net incen-
tives to deviate downwards are sufficiently strong. Thus, a variation of our model that allows for small costs
of misreporting would imply the same comparative static predictions as our model and would also predict low
rates in the case of uninformative submissions.
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readily available.
Finally, our model is related to the recent game theory literature that explores how cheap
talk communication can improve the outcome of markets with search frictions (Menzio, 2007;
Kim and Kircher, 2015; Backus, Blake, and Tadelis, 2019). The difference with our theory part
is that these models do not deliver comparative statics about the informativeness of the cheap
talk reports. Our empirical test of these comparative statics may also be of more general game
theoretic interest. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that explicitly tests the
negative relationship between the level of disagreement and signal precision predicted by cheap
talk models. These results add to the increasing literature suggesting that cheap talk equilibria
do exist outside experimental settings (Goel and Thakor, 2015; Backus, Blake, and Tadelis,
2019) and have the properties predicted by theory.
2 The Model
We start with an informal description of the institutional features of the interbank market and
explain how we capture this setup with the three main elements of our theoretical model: The
Libor panel banks, the lenders and the stock market.
The members of the Libor panel are large banks that operate at the core of the interbank
market. They centralize most of the trades and borrow from a stable network in a frictionless
market up to the point of exhausting all their gains from trade.15 This determines for each
of these banks a (marginal) borrowing cost that we model, for simplicity, as exogenous and
assume to be the bank’s private information. It is this interest rate that the Libor mechanism
tries to elicit from each of the panel banks.
The panel banks can also borrow from non-relationship lenders that participate in a second
15These banks, sometimes called money-center banks, carry out the majority of transactions in the in-
terbank market with a limited number of counterparties with whom they have stable relationships (Cocco,
Gomes, and Martins, 2009), often formalized by contingent credit lines, see Müller (2006).
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tier of the interbank market.16 Although most of these lenders are also banks, we refer to them
as lenders and use the term banks only for the panel banks. Lenders only operate occasionally
and their trades are affected by search costs. In our model, the information disclosed by the
Libor reports can mitigate these search costs by helping the lenders to find the most profitable
lending opportunity among the banks. The formal search protocol is described below.
Finally, bank management not only wants to make profits from the interbank operations,
but is also concerned about the market’s perception of the bank’s financial health. The precise
reasons for why banks wanted to project financial health are still being discussed in the ongoing
lawsuits (Binham and Thompson, 2017), but it is intuitive that a large number of the bank’s
activities, including the interbank market operations, will be negatively affected by a perception
of high failure risk. In our model we summarize all of these effects by assuming that, in
periods of financial stress, high refinancing costs negatively affect the bank’s fundamental value.
Management is assumed to maximize the bank’s stock price, computed mechanically as the
bank’s expected fundamental value conditional on the Libor reports, plus the profits from the
interbank market.
Model Setup
To capture how search frictions interact with the Libor reports we adapt the model of Kim and
Kircher (2015). Similar to their setup, we want to abstract from strategic interaction between
banks. We therefore assume for simplicity a continuum of (panel) banks17 with a measure
normalized to be one. We also assume a continuum of lenders with measure β. Lenders are
homogeneous but banks differ in their borrowing costs in the first tier of the interbank market.
16See Craig and Von Peter (2014) for a detailed description of this two tiered structure of the interbank
market.
17The main complication of assuming a finite set of banks is that a unilateral deviation of a bank has a
nonzero effect on the distribution of quotes received by the other banks and thus on the opportunity cost
faced by lenders when making an offer to the deviating bank. Instead of assuming a continuum of banks it
is also possible to focus on a single bank and assume that instead of competing with other banks to attract
lenders it just competes with a fixed outside option. The results in this case are similar.
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Efficient bargaining in the first tier of the interbank market means that each bank’s value
of an (additional) unit of credit in the second tier is equal to its (marginal) borrowing cost
in the first tier. For simplicity, we assume the borrowing cost in the first tier, and thus the
value the bank puts on one (additional) unit of credit in the second tier, as exogenous with
a cumulative distribution F over the set V = [v, v], where F (v) denotes the fraction of banks
with a value (i.e. borrowing cost) less than v. For technical reasons we assume F to have a
density F ′ bounded above by η > 0 and below by 1
η
.
In this setup, banks and lenders make the following decisions: Banks decide about the report
m they submit to the Libor panel after having privately learned their value v. Lenders observe
these reports and use them to select with which banks to trade. For the sake of tractability, we
assume a stylized search and bargaining protocol: Each lender submits a quote, if any, to only
one bank and each bank chooses the lowest quote received, unless it is higher than its value.
Other search and bargaining protocols should lead to similar albeit less clear-cut predictions.
Strategies
We follow the description of the strategies and payoffs of Kim and Kircher (2015) simplified for
the sake of readability. A (pure) communication strategy of a Libor panel bank is described by
a function Q : V → M that maps each bank’s value v ∈ V into a report m ∈ M. The lenders’
(mixed) strategy is described by a cumulative distribution function P on M × [0, v], where
P (m, b) is the fraction of lenders that submit a quote less than b to banks that reported less
than m.18 There is no need to allow for bids above v as they are always rejected by the banks.
Public beliefs about a bank’s value conditional on a given submission can be characterized by
a distribution function µ : R+ ×M, where µ(v,m) denotes the fraction of banks whose values
are believed to be strictly below v among those banks that reported m.
18Note that we have dropped the dependence of the lender’s strategy on the observed distribution of re-
ports submitted to the Libor panel. This is without loss since our assumption that there is a continuum of
banks means that a unilateral deviation of a bank does not change the observed distribution of reports.
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As in Kim and Kircher (2015), we are interested in interval partition equilibria. These
are equilibria in which the banks’ communication strategy partitions V into intervals. Each of
these intervals is what we call a pooling interval as all banks with a value in the pooling interval
submit the same report and banks with values in different pooling intervals submit different
reports. Our main result is in terms of the size of these pooling intervals, which we refer to
as the coarseness of the equilibrium. For notational convenience, we assume that the set of
possible reports M is identical to the set of values V and assign higher reports m ∈ V to higher
pooling intervals. Thus, in an interval partition equilibrium, the communication strategy of
banks is an increasing function Q and the induced distribution of reports is characterised by
QM(m) = F (sup{v : Q(v) = m}), where QM(m) is the fraction of banks that report m or less
to the Libor panel.
Payoff Functions
To provide a more intuitive description of the payoff functions, we describe the lenders’ strategy
using the concept of “queue length” borrowed from the literature on markets with a contin-
uum of agents and search frictions. Formally, the queue length λ(·, b) is the Radon-Nikodym
derivative of βP (·, b) with respect to the distribution of reports submitted to the Libor panel
QM.
19 Intuitively, λ(m, v) is the expected number of quotes weakly below a certain threshold b
received by a bank that submits a report m. Thus, integrating over the set of possible reports
19This is a function whose integral with respect to QM is equal to βP (·, b):
∫
[v,m]
λ(m̃, b)dQM(m̃) = βP (m, b), for any m ∈ V.
It combines the likelihood of the lenders making an offer to a bank with report m with the likelihood of the
bank having chosen m and the lenders’ conditional distribution of quotes after having chosen to make an offer
to a bank with report m.
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M one obtains the total mass of quotes:20
∫
M
λ(m̃, v) dQM(m̃) = β. (1)
The usefulness of λ comes from the following observation. In a version of our model with
finitely many agents, the equilibrium distribution of quotes less than b received by each bank
having reported m follows a binomial distribution. This distribution converges to a Poisson
distribution with parameter λ(m, b) as the number of agents tends to infinity.21 Thus, e−λ(m,b)
is the limit probability that a bank reporting m does not receive any quote weakly below b. We
use this limit probability below, to characterize the bank’s payoffs.
The bank chooses its report to maximize the expected fundamental value plus its profits
in the interbank market. For simplicity, we assume that the bank only borrows one additional
unit of credit in the second tier of the interbank market and thus its profits are equal to the
difference between the value v that the bank puts in this unit of credit and the lowest quote
received, if less than v. As explained above, the probability that the lowest quote is less than b is
1− e−λ(m,b). Besides, the bank’s fundamental value is computed from the public beliefs µ(v,m)
under the assumption that the bank’s fundamental value is a function w(v) differentiable and
decreasing in the bank’s value v. The bank’s expected payoff is thus:22










A lender offering an interest rate b to a bank reporting m is accepted if no other lender
submits a lower quote and the bank’s value is larger than b. The probability of the former event
is, again by a limit argument, e−λ(m,b) in the case in which e−λ(m,·) has no atom at b, and the
20Formally, this equation is a direct consequence of the definition of λ as a Radon-Nykodym derivative of
P , see Footnote 19.
21For a formal derivation see Kim and Kircher (2015) Footnote 16 and Section 4.
22To avoid confusion, we use a tilde on the variable of integration here and in what follows.
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probability of the latter event is 1 − µ(b,m). Since we assume that the lender’s opportunity
cost of funds is normalized to zero and that the interbank loans are risk-free,23 the lender’s
expected payoff is:
U(m, b;λ, µ) = e−λ(m,b) (1− µ(b,m)) b, (3)
if e−λ(m,·) has no atom at b. The former expression has to be modified to account for ties
if e−λ(m,·) has an atom at b. This case is less relevant for our analysis because a Bertrand
argument implies here that the distribution of quotes cannot have atoms. The formal details
can be found in Kim and Kircher (2015).
Note that the lenders’ payoff function (3) is only well-defined for reports m in the support of
QM. This is sufficient for equilibrium existence because we can always define out-of-equilibrium
beliefs that guarantee lack of incentives to deviate outside the support of QM. For instance,
we could fix the interpretation of any out-of-equilibrium messages as identical to one of the
equilibrium messages. This is a common property of games with cheap talk communication.
Besides, standard equilibrium selection arguments are not used as messages are not directly
payoff relevant, see the discussion in Banks and Sobel (1987), Section 5.
We are interested in the case in which the ratio of lenders to banks is sufficiently high to
guarantee that all banks have a positive probability of receiving a quote in equilibrium. This
is consistent with the fact the Libor panel only includes banks that are active in the interbank







23Assuming a probability of default increasing with the bank’s value plays a similar role as our assumption
that the bank’s fundamental value is decreasing in its value for additional credit: it gives the bank incentives
to submit a lower report. The analysis of this type of setup is, however, slightly more complex as an increas-




Definition: An interval partition equilibrium is a communication strategy Q, a distribution
of quotes P (with associated queue length λ) and a belief system µ such that:
❼ Bank’s Optimality: For any v ∈ V ,
V (Q(v), v;λ, µ) ≥ V (m′, v;λ, µ), ∀m′ ∈ M.
❼ Lender’s Optimality: (m, b) ∈ supp P (·, ·) implies
U(m, b;λ, µ) ≥ U(m′, b′;λ, µ), ∀(m′, b′) ∈ M× R+.
❼ Belief Consistency: For eachm ∈ M, ifQ−1(m) = {v} then µ(v,m) puts all its probability
mass at v, and if Q−1(m) = [v, v′], v′ > v, then,
µ(v̂, m) =
F (v̂)− F (v)
F (v′)− F (v)
for v̂ ∈ [v, v′]. (5)
In the next lemma, we pin down the value of λ from the lender’s optimality condition that
requires that the lender must get the same payoff, denoted by u∗(Q), in the support of its
strategy.
Lemma 1. For any given communication strategy Q and report m in the range of Q, the
lender’s optimality and (1) are satisfied if and only if λ(m, b) = 0 for b < u∗(Q) and:






























The value of u∗(Q) is computed as the unique solution to the equation resulting from
substituting (6) into (1).
For v equal to the infimum of the pooling interval associated to m and δ its size, the right
hand side of (6) has a particularly simple form in two cases that we use in our next discussion:





if b ∈ [u∗(Q), v].
(C2) The support of λ(m, ·) is equal to [u∗(Q), v] if δ ≤ v
η2
.24
The former property holds true because µ(b̂, m) = 0 for b̂ < v, and the latter because the
sup-term in (6) is decreasing in b̂, and thus λ constant, for b̂ ≥ v when δ is sufficiently small.
Property (C1) is the key insight of the work of Kim and Kircher (2015) that simplifies our
analysis. It means that our particular bargaining and search protocol has the property that the
distribution of quotes below v does not vary with a larger report. Property (C2) simplifies the
bank’s payoff description and it is consistent with our interest in equilibria with small pooling
intervals.
In what follows, we take as given the lenders’ play in Lemma 1 and study the bank’s
optimality condition. As is usually the case in cheap talk games, a necessary and sufficient
condition is that the banks with values in the extreme points of the pooling intervals do not
have incentives to deviate. In our case, this is a consequence of the supermodularity of (2) in
(m, v) when λ is as in (6). We study these incentives to deviate next.
24The condition δ ≤ v
η2
implies that −bF ′(ṽ)+F (ṽ+δ)−F (ṽ) ≤ − v
η
+δη ≤ 0 for any b ≥ v. This inequality
and (5) implies that the term between curly brackets in (6) is increasing in b̂ up to b̂ = v and then decreasing.
Hence, the supremum in (6) is achieved at b̂ = v when b ≥ v, which means that λ is constant in [b, v] and thus
puts zero measure in [b, v].
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Take the lower bounds v and v′ corresponding to the pooling intervals associated to the
reports m and m′. (C1) means that two different reports m and m′ induce the same queues at
any price b less than both v and v′. This implies that a bank with value v does not improve by
submitting a higher report m′ > m: The deviation does not change the distribution of quotes
below v but implies a lower fundamental value. (C1) also implies that submitting a lower report
m′ < m only changes the distribution of quotes above v′. Besides, if (C2) applies, the bank
does not get any quote in [v′, v] with the deviation m′. Thus, the incentive to deviate from m
















If (C2) does not apply, the loss of quotes in a downward deviation is smaller and thus (8)
becomes a lower bound to the incentives to deviate.
The first term of (8) is the increase in the bank’s fundamental value when it deviates and
submits a lower report m′. The second term corresponds to the forgone profits in the interbank
market due to the lost quotes after the deviation. The first term is absent when the bank’s
value (i.e. cost of borrowing) is irrelevant for the fundamental value, formally when w(v) is
constant in v. In this case, there is a fully revealing equilibrium. However, there is no fully
revealing equilibrium whenever the stock market is sensitive to the bank’s value. This can be
deduced from (8): Submitting a report m′ marginally lower than m gives first order gains from
improving the fundamental value, whereas the losses in the interbank market are of second
order as only quotes close to v are lost. A variation of this argument gives a lower bound to
the size of the pooling intervals which is the basis for our empirical analysis.
Proposition 1. There is no interval partition equilibrium strategies (Q,P, µ) in which the size
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of any of the pooling intervals is less than:




A variation of the above argument also implies that there exists an equilibrium with pooling
intervals smaller than a similar bound to (9), if some additional conditions are met.








is concave in v,25 then there exists
some interval partition equilibrium strategies (Q,P, µ) in which the size of each of the pooling
intervals is less than:




The particular value of the bounds is derived in the proof from approximations to the








The size of the pooling intervals reflects the coarseness of the information disclosed. Thus,
Propositions 1 and 2 show how the maximum equilibrium information disclosure varies with
the slope of w and the ratio of lenders to banks β. The former is intuitive. The more the
stock market is sensitive to the report, the more the bank benefits from underreporting, which
explains why the maximum equilibrium information disclosure decreases. The ratio of lenders
to banks affects coarseness through the competitiveness of the interbank market. The greater
this ratio, the greater the competition among lenders and thus the lower their expected quotes.
Thus, a deviation that sheds away high quotes is less costly for the bank.
25The first condition of Proposition 2 guarantees that the upper bound in (10) is sufficiently small for (C2)
to apply. The second is a regularity condition that it is satisfied, for instance, when w is linear and F uni-
form. The role of this regularity condition is to guarantee that the indifference condition that usually defines
the size of the pooling intervals in a cheap talk equilibrium has no more than one solution. An equivalent
condition is satisfied in Crawford and Sobel (1982) as a consequence of their assumption that a sender’s util-
ity is concave in the receiver’s action.
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Note that the two effects pointed out in the paragraph above reinforce each other. The
greater the stock market sensitivity, the greater is the effect of the ratio of lenders to banks
on the minimum coarseness of the equilibrium. To see why, notice that whereas the minimum
equilibrium coarseness varies with the ratio of lenders to banks if the stock market is sensitive
to the submission, this is not the case otherwise. The reason is that there exists a fully revealing
equilibrium when the fundamental value is not sensitive to the reports, and thus the ratio of
lenders to banks has no effect on the minimum coarseness of the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 also sheds some light on the welfare implications of the design of the Libor
panel. On the one hand, it shows that the feedback of the Libor reports on the functioning of
the interbank market can be sufficient to induce honest Libor reporting in the cases in which
the Libor reports have a negligible effect on the stock market. However, this deterrence is
not sufficient once the stock market becomes more reactive to the Libor reports which seems
plausible in periods of crisis. On the other hand, the analysis of Kim and Kircher (2015)
shows that full information disclosure in the Libor panel implies that the equilibrium queues
of Lemma 1 maximize the sum of the payoffs of banks and lenders. Together with Proposition
2, this implies that, as the effect on the fundamental value becomes negligible, the information
disclosed by the Libor reports induce the maximum social surplus that can be created in the
interbank market subject to the search costs of Lemma 1.
3 Data and Graphical Evidence
In this section, we describe the data and illustrate the pattern of rounding with a series of simple
graphs. Our data set consists of daily reports submitted by the up to 18 panel banks26 for all
26We use the Reuters Libor codes for the banks. The banks are Bank of America (BAFX), Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd (BTML), Barclays Bank plc (BARL), Citibank NA (CTGL), Credit Suisse (CSBL),
Deutsche Bank AG (DBBL), HSBC (HSBL) and JP Morgan Chase (JPML) BNP Paribas (BPGL), Credit
Agricole CIB (CALL), Lloyds Banking Group (LOYL), The Norinchukin Bank (NORL), Rabobank (RABO),
Royal Bank of Canada (RBCL), The Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBSL), Sociètè Gènèrale (SGBL),
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SUML) and UBS AG (UBSL). We have not included West LB and
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15 maturities obtained from Reuters.27 We complete these data with the banks’ credit default
swap (CDS) spreads (see Figure S1 in the Online supplementary material). CDS contracts
are standardized insurance contracts against credit risk, which are traded in comparatively
liquid markets. They are usually written for longer maturities, ranging from 1 to 30 years. To
maximize comparability with the short term Libor rates, we use spreads on the 1 year contract,
obtained from Markit.28
We use ten years of data from January 2005 to December 2014. The main analysis focuses on
the period between 1.1.2005 and 30.4.2013, during which CDS data are available for almost all
banks and during which the Libor setting process remained unchanged. Our panel is not fully
balanced as a number of banks entered and left the Libor panel during and after the crisis.29
After April 2013 the ICE Benchmark Administration (IBA) who had succeeded the BBA as
the administrator of Libor implemented two key changes: It eliminated eight of the less liquid
tenors out of the original 15 maturities30 to make sure that Libor submissions can be explicitly
supported by transaction data and it delayed the publication of individual submissions by three
months so that individual submissions cannot be “interpreted as signals (often erroneously) of
a change in the creditworthiness of a submitter” (ICE, 2015, p.30). As an illustration for the
submission process and the structure of the data, Table 1 presents all submissions from the US
dollar Libor panel banks to the BBA on the 10th of October 2006.
[Table 1 about here.]
HBOS which failed during the financial crisis.
27Until April 2013, Libor submissions were provided for the following maturities: Overnight (ON), one
week (SW), two weeks (2W), one to 11 months (1M, 2M,..., 11M) and one year (1Y).
28Different types of CDS contracts are used in different geographic regions. To maximize liquidity and
data availability we have used the junior contract with the MR/Modified Restructuring clause for North
American banks, the MM/Modified Modified Restructuring for European and the CR/Complete Restruc-
turing clause for Japanese banks. For 2014, we replaced these contracts with the corresponding contracts
following the new 2014 credit derivatives definitions.
29See Snider and Youle (2014) for a precise description of changes in the panel.
30The remaining tenors are the overnight (“ON”), single week (“SW”), one, two, three and six month
(“1M”“2M”,“3M”,“6M”) as well as the one year rate (“1Y”).
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Figure 1 shows the overall evolution of the Libor benchmark rates (i.e. the interquartile
means) for all 15 maturities. The two vertical lines indicate two key dates in the crisis. The
first one indicates July 31st, 2007, when Bear Stearns’ High-Grade Structured Credit Fund
collapsed. The second line indicates September 15th, 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed for
bankruptcy. The spike in refinancing rates corresponding to the crisis entering its climax in
the second half of 2008 is clearly visible. Figure 2 plots the daily standard deviation of the
submissions across different banks for each maturity. This illustrates that the crisis period was
not so much exceptional for the absolute size of the panel banks’ borrowing costs, but rather
for the strong dispersion of refinancing rates between banks.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
The crisis period also corresponds to a clearly visible change in the banks’ submission
patterns. Table 2 again presents the full number of submissions by panel banks, but now
two years later, for the 10th of October 2008, roughly one month after the Lehman failure.
Compared to Table 1 the increase in rounding is obvious. Not only do most banks now submit
only two instead of three decimals, the second decimal also is rarely different from “5”.
[Table 2 about here.]
That coarseness is not caused by a lack of information becomes particularly clear when one
compares the evolution of bidding behavior before and after the 2013 reform that delayed the
publication of individual submissions. As an example for the change in the bidding behavior
we plot in Figure 3 the submissions by BNP Paribas for the seven tenors that remained after
the reform. Clearly, more information is revealed in the bids submitted after April 2013.
Interestingly, while BNP Paribas is not the only bank to change its behavior, this is not true
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for all banks.31 Explaining the heterogeneity in submission strategies after the reform is beyond
the scope of this paper as our model requires submissions to be visible, but the change in bidding
strategies as well as the differences in bidding strategies across banks strongly suggest that the
coarseness of submissions is the result of a strategic choice.32
[Figure 3 about here.]
To understand the bidding behavior in more detail, we analyze the distribution of digits
used for the second decimal of the individual submissions. A change in this decimal corresponds
to one basis point, the usual unit of measure in fixed income markets.33
Our theoretical model predicts that the coarseness of Libor submissions depends on the sen-
sitivity of the bank’s expected value to the information from the interbanking market. Keeping
other things equal, this sensitivity is expected to be high, when a bank’s CDS spread is high, as
in this case, investors are wary of additional bad news. With a series of univariate comparisons
we try to illustrate that, indeed, as predicted, CDS spreads and liquidity are related to the
coarseness of submissions and that they reinforce each other.
Figures 4 plots the distribution of digits for banks that have, on a given day, a CDS spread
in the top and bottom quartile of CDS spreads observed during 2005-2014. Note that we
adapted the y-axis to better visualize the differences. The horizontal line at 0.1 corresponds to
the frequency we would expect if the distribution was uniform across all digits.
31For example Bank of America’s rounding behavior remains unchanged by the reform (see Figure S2 in
the online supplementary material).
32Figures S5 and S6 in the online supplementary material provide some additional graphical evidence for
the change in bidding strategies. Until the 2013 reform, successive bids were strongly correlated, but this au-
tocorrelation abruptly decreases after the reform. We think that this is related to the recommendation of
the Wheatley report (Wheatley, 2012) and the new ICE submission guidelines implemented after April 2013,
which encouraged banks to rely less on “expert judgment and instead justify their submissions by document-
ing underlying market transactions. It seems that, as a consequence, banks’ submissions became less stable,
as they started to reflect not only overall market conditions, but also transaction-related idiosyncratic fac-
tors such as bid size, transaction costs and the relative bargaining power of the lender and borrower. Note,
that the heterogeneity in bidding strategies has been identified as a problem by the IBA. They state in their
first position paper that after the reform that “each benchmark submitter has developed its own methodology
for establishing LIBOR submissions. A variety of approaches now exists” and encourage banks to work on a
conversion of approaches (ICE Benchmark Administration Limited, 2014).
33As a basis point is 1/100th of a percentage point.
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As predicted, the distribution of digits strongly varies with CDS spreads. Evidence of
rounding is clearly visible in Figure 4 (b) corresponding to the most risky periods and banks,
with the digits “0” and “5” occurring roughly 50% more often than other digits. In contrast,
the distribution for periods and banks with low CDS spreads in Figure 4 (a) is closer to the
uniform distribution.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Our theoretical model also predicts that coarseness of the Libor submissions should vary
with the liquidity of the underlying interbank market. Measuring liquidity is, however, more
difficult as few detailed data about volumes in interbank markets are available. As time and
cross-bank differences in liquidity are strongly correlated with the market’s perception of credit
risk, we will exploit cross-maturity differences in transaction volumes. Afonso, Kovner, and
Schoar (2011) and Kuo, Skeie, Vickery, and Youle (2014) demonstrate that liquidity is higher
for short term rates, such as the overnight or one week rates, as well as for a number of
commonly used reference tenors, such as the 1 month, 3 month and 1 year maturities. If we
compare the distribution of digits as a function of liquidity/maturity a clear pattern emerges.
As an example we reproduce in Figure 5 the distribution of digits for the (very liquid) overnight
and the (very illiquid) eight month maturities.
[Figure 5 about here.]
To generate a simple measure of rounding across the 15 different maturities, we next con-
struct a dummy variable “Rounding in the 2nd Decimal”, indicating that a bank submitted
“0” or “5” as the second decimal and did not provide any smaller decimals. If banks submit
only two decimals and do not round, we would expect the average value of this dummy to be
0.2. With three or more decimals the dummy should always be zero. This measure captures
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coarseness in the most relevant range, but we lose some information about more extreme levels
of coarseness, as rounding may also take place in the first, third and fourth digits.34
Figures 6 (a) and (b) represent the frequency of rounding in the second decimal across
maturities for banks with CDS spreads in the top and bottom quartiles. Again, a clear pattern
can be recognized. Whereas the frequency of rounding is low and relatively stable across
maturities for quiet markets, it is much higher and decreases overall with maturity in turbulent
markets. Interestingly, certain more heavily traded reference rates such as the 3 month, 9 month
and 1 year tenors exhibit more rounding than the neighboring less liquid tenors. These patterns
fit perfectly with our predictions, but are difficult to reconcile with alternative explanations for
rounding, as explained in more detail in Section 4.3.
[Figure 6 about here.]
The evolution of rounding corroborates these patterns. Figure 7 plots a 63 day35 moving
average of rounding in the second decimal across all maturities for the different panel banks.
The change in rounding behavior at the two key dates corresponding to the failures of the
Bear Stearns fund and Lehman Brothers is clearly visible. There is also a visible difference
in the extent of rounding between banks. A similar picture can be drawn for the evolution of
rounding in the different maturities averaged out across banks (Figure 8). The high frequency
of rounding for the very short term rates between the two key events of the unfolding crisis is
particularly striking. Again this is perfectly in line with our theory: During this time, serious
concerns about bank stability had emerged, but banks did not yet rely on central banks for
liquidity provision and interbank markets still had high trading volumes. The highest frequency
of rounding is visible in the overnight rates at the crisis dates, other key rates such as the three
month or nine month rate also show a higher occurrence of rounding.
34See the online supplementary material for graphical evidence using the number of submitted decimals as
an alternative proxy for coarseness.
35This corresponds to the approximate number of trading days in three months.
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[Figure 7 about here.]
[Figure 8 about here.]
4 Multivariate Analysis
In this section, we present simple multivariate tests to complement the graphical evidence
from the previous section and assess the statistical significance of the observations made above.
Recall that Propositions 1 and 2 from our model predict that 1) the minimum coarseness of
the Libor submissions increases when the bank’s expected market value becomes more sensitive
to the information from the interbank market, 2) coarseness increases with the liquidity of the
underlying interbank market and, 3) these effects interact positively, i.e. the coarseness of the
submissions reacts stronger to the sensitivity to information from the interbank market in more
liquid markets.
As in the previous section, we focus on the banks’ one year subordinate CDS spreads as a
proxy for the sensitivity of the bank’s market value with respect to the interbank borrowing
costs and measure the coarseness of the submissions with the dummy variable “Rounding in
the 2nd Decimal” defined above. To proxy for liquidity we introduce a new indicator variable
“Liquid Maturities” that takes the value of 1 if the submission is for one of the tenors that
survived the 2013 reform.
We analyze again 10 years of data from January 2005 to December 2014 with a focus
on the period until April 2013, as from May 2013 on the Libor reform ended the immediate
disclosure of individual submissions and removed more than half of the submitted tenors. This
corresponds to a total of 530,952 individual submissions across different banks, maturities and
trading dates. For 489,158 of these observations we have CDS spreads, as for the non-listed
Norinchukin Bank and Rabobank 1 year CDS data are not available in the first years of our
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sample. Summary statistics are simple: The average CDS spread is 1.04 percent with a median
of 0.58 and a standard deviation of 1.34 percent. The highest CDS spread in our sample is
15.3% attained by Citigroup in April 2009 and the lowest 0.012% for Rabobank in May 2007.
The average frequency of rounding in the second decimal is 20.3 percent.
4.1 Baseline Specification
To test how risk and liquidity affect the coarseness of the banks’ submissions, we regress the
“Rounding” dummy on the banks’ CDS spreads together with the “Liquid Maturities” dummy
and an interaction term for these two variables. Formally, we run the following regression:
Roundingt,b,m = β·CDS spreadt,b
+ γ ·D(Liquid Maturities)m
+ λ ·D(Liquid Maturities)m×CDS spreadt,b
+ µb + µt + ǫt,b,m,
(11)
where µb and µt stand for bank fixed effects and time controls, respectively. Despite our
dependent variables being binary, we choose to use an ordinary least square estimation (OLS)
of a linear probability model rather than logit or probit. This will considerably simplify the
analysis of autocorrelated errors with no clear structure in our panel setting. Given that for our
preferred specification with annual time controls all predicted values in our sample lie in the
interval [0, 1], the potential bias of the linear probability model is likely to be small.36 Simple
OLS standard errors for this regression will be biased due to the presence of heteroskedasticity
and serial as well as cross sectional correlation. To cope with these biases, we determine robust
standard errors that are two-way clustered at the bank and time levels.
The results are presented in Table 3. In models (1) and (2) with annual time controls, all
36See Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). In the specification with daily dummies, predicted values lie outside the
interval [0, 1].
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coefficients have the predicted sign and are significant. Both, a higher CDS spread and more
liquid maturities are associated with coarser submissions i.e. a higher frequency of rounding.
The sign of the interaction term is positive, indicating that coarseness is more sensitive to
CDS spreads for more liquid maturities. In models (4) and (5), with full time fixed effects at
daily frequency, the effect of liquidity on rounding remains significant. The coefficient for the
interaction term is again positive with similar size, but only significant at the 10% level, and
the coefficient for the CDS spread still has the correct sign, but is not significant.
[Table 3 about here.]
These results imply that the relationship between CDS and rounding is mostly identified
from the time variation. Indeed, the average risk of the banking sector seems to be more relevant
than the individual CDS spreads. In model (3), we add the daily cross-bank average of CDS
spreads to the baseline regression. The results are clear: This measure of the overall banking
sector risk is highly significant, whereas individual CDS spreads become non-significant.37 This
surprising result might be caused by poor data quality. We only have quotes, not transaction
data for CDS spreads, and liquidity was likely low, especially at the height of the crisis. Possibly,
some of this noise can be reduced by taking the cross sectional mean.
However, there might also exist a more fundamental explanation. The large banks contained
in the Libor panel are affected by similar risk factors and strongly interconnected. If one or
several banks in the sample are known to be in trouble, reflected by high CDS spreads, investors
will be particularly attentive to signals that could indicate that any other bank might have a
problem as well, either because it is exposed to the same risk factors or because it is connected to
the risky bank. Clearly, in this situation, a bank that would disclose high borrowing costs (even
if its CDS spread was initially low) could suddenly raise alarm about its prospects. Possibly,
banks considered to be healthy might even be more concerned about releasing negative signals
37These results do not change if we exclude the submitting bank’s CDS spread when calculating the aver-
age.
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than banks that are known to have problems and can, in any case, be expected to face high
borrowing costs in the interbanking market. In this context, the main driver for the sensitivity
of a bank’s expected value to the information from the interbanking market might not be the
banks own CDS spread, but rather the overall perception of the riskiness of the banking sector
reflected by the average CDS spread.
In the following sections, we will for convenience mostly keep individual CDS spreads rather
than the cross sectional average as independent variable and use annual time controls. Average
CDS spreads and alternative time controls provide largely similar results, but if too many time
controls are added, the coefficient for CDS spreads becomes insignificant.38 Further evidence
confirming the robustness of our results is presented in the next section, where we analyze the
evolution of rounding pattern and demonstrate that our results remain significant for several
non-overlapping sub-periods.
We have also run the above regressions separately for each of the 18 panel banks.39 These
tests demonstrate that there is a fair level of heterogeneity. Some banks do not seem to exhibit
the rounding pattern that we have identified in the regressions above. We think that this is
not inconsistent with our theory. Our model can only provide a lower bound for the length of
signal intervals, but we cannot exclude that some banks play equilibria with larger intervals or
the “babbling equilibrium”, where submissions have no informational content.
As an additional robustness test we have replicated our baseline regressions with other
measures for coarseness of the submissions. In the online supplementary material, we provide
the results of using the number of submitted digits instead of “Rounding in the 2nd Decimal” as
the dependent variable. With this measure of coarseness our results are verified for 2005-2010,
38See Table S1 in the online supplementary material for a version of models (1) and (2) in Table 3, where
individual CDS spreads are replaced by average CDS spreads. We cannot add average CDS spreads to models
(4) and (5) since they are perfectly multicollinear with daily fixed effects. Still, the cross effect of the average
CDS spread with liquidity is positive and significant at the 5% level. For alternative time controls, see Table
S2 in the online supplementary material presenting our baseline regression with time controls according to the
different phases of the crisis as defined by Kuo, Skeie, Vickery, and Youle (2014).
39The results are in Table S5 in the online supplementary material.
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where very few banks submitted more than three decimals (See Figure S3 and S4 in the online
supplementary material), however in the later period the high number of decimals submitted
by certain banks render the coefficient on CDS spreads not significant for the full period.
4.2 Evolution of Rounding Patterns
More evidence comes from a finer analysis of how the banks’ rounding behavior changes over
time. Figures 9 and 10 depict the evolution of regression coefficients when estimating equation
(11) for moving two-year subperiods. To generate the quarterly results used for the graph, we
have run separate regressions, each with 24 month of data, covering a time window stretching
from 12 months before to 12 months after the beginning of the respective quarter.40 Note, that
in order to be able to include the years 2013 and 2014 we only use in these regressions the seven
maturities remaining after the 2013 reform. As a consequence we have to use a more restrictive
definition of liquid maturities. We know from Kuo, Skeie, Vickery, and Youle (2014) that there
exist a number of reference rates with higher liquidity, such as the overnight (“ON”), three
month (“3M”), six month (“6M”) and one year (“1Y”) tenor and we use these reference tenors
to identify more liquid markets.
[Figure 9 about here.]
[Figure 10 about here.]
The relationships between rounding, maturity and liquidity predicted by our model are
both clearly present over the crisis period from 2007 to 2009, but then fade out rapidly. This is
probably because successful liquidity injections by central banks reduced the informativeness
of lending conditions in the interbanking market as a sign of financial distress and therefore
weakened the sensitivity of a banks expected value to the interbank rates. In addition, starting
40The time windows at the beginning and the end of the period are truncated for dates below 2005 and
above 2015.
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in 2009, banks seem to have become increasingly aware of the legal risks related to suspicious
Libor submissions pattern. The trigger likely was the British Financial Services Authoritys
(FSA) inquiry into Barclays in late 2009, followed in Nov. 2009 by the BBA’s issuance of new
guidelines on setting Libor rates. At this time attention shifted from potential “Libor suppres-
sion” (Mollenkamp and Whitehouse, 2008) to the suspicion of “trader-based manipulations”
(Snider and Youle, 2014) and banks started to avoid patterns that could be interpreted as the
result of these manipulations. In particular, several banks rapidly increased the number of
reported decimals (see Figure S3 in the online supplementary material). It seems likely that
they did this to minimize legal risk rather than for reasons related to our model.
In 2013, at the time of the fundamental Libor reform, the two effects predicted by our model
had already become insignificant.41 This makes it likely that the explanation for the change in
bidding strategies after the reform that we documented with Figure 3 in Section 3 lies outside
our model.
4.3 Excluding Alternative Explanations
The results listed above are consistent with our model, but there exist alternative mechanisms
that might be able to explain our observations. For example, it is conceivable that the relation-
ship between rounding and liquidity is actually generated by a relationship between rounding
and maturity. Shorter maturities may require less precision given that the monetary conse-
quences of investing at a rounded rate are less important.42 This story, however, does not seem
consistent with the fact that the liquidity effect that we identify here fades gradually after 2009,
as shown in Figure 10, or the fact that coarseness seems to be a strategic choice, as we discuss
41Using “Number of submitted decimals” as the dependent variable confirms these patterns, see Figure S7
and Figure S8 in the online supplementary material.
42Maturity dependent rounding exists in other markets. For example, bids in government auctions for US
Treasury bills, which have a maturity of less than one year, are made in discount rates quoted in three dec-
imals with 0.005 increments. Bids in the longer term Treasury bond auctions are made in yields with 0.001
increments (Department of the Treasury, 2004). Note, that in this example rounding is in the third decimal of
the yield. This implies a much finer grid than rounding in the second decimal.
30
in Section 3. More importantly, we can exploit the fact that the relationship between both
variables is not monotonous to test whether rounding is driven by maturity or liquidity. As
mentioned above, certain references rates have higher liquidity than the neighboring tenors. If
rounding is driven by maturity, the more liquid reference rates should not exhibit more rounding
than surrounding less liquid rates with, on average, the same maturity.
Table 4 presents the result of regressing rounding on liquidity and CDS spreads for different
sub-samples, each including a liquid reference rate such as the ON, 3M, 6M and 1Y tenor
together with the neighboring less frequently traded tenors.43 Only for the six month rate
the level of rounding is not significantly different from the surrounding rates, likely because
liquidity is low. In all other cases, submissions for reference rates exhibit significantly more
rounding than the surrounding less liquid maturities. In particular, the one year rate is more
frequently rounded than the submissions for the shorter, but less liquid 11 month tenor and the
three month rate is more frequently rounded than the surrounding two month and four month
rates. That the overnight rate exhibits more rounding than the less liquid and longer one week
tenor is not surprising, but still demonstrates that similar maturities with different liquidity
can exhibit different coarseness.44
[Table 4 about here.]
Another possibility is that the patterns of rounding we observe are caused by collusive
behavior. This would, however, have to be a different type of collusion than the “Trader
based manipulations”, which, as discussed in the introduction, are not likely to have caused
rounding. Abrantes-Metz and Metz (2012) argue that banks have colluded to submit identical
values. Rounding might have been a way to facilitate this coordination. To test this hypothesis
we report in Table S6 in the online supplementary material a version of our baseline regression
43We have excluded the one month rate as (Kuo, Skeie, Vickery, and Youle, 2014) document that during
and after the crisis period maturities between one week and less than a month far dominated the volume of
transactions executed at the one month tenor.
44A version of Table 4 with daily controls yields similar results for the coefficient of “Reference Tenors.”
However, the coefficient of “CDS spread” becomes non significant.
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were we have added a dummy variable “Duplicated”, indicating if another bank has made the
same submission. Our results remain significant, which suggests that the relationships we have
identified are not related to the potential coordination of submissions on the same numbers.45
Indeed, rounded numbers strongly vary across banks and rounding is particularly prevalent in
times of market turmoil. This makes it unlikely that collusion is the source of rounding.
5 Conclusion
This paper constructs a model of directed search in the interbank market and tests its empirical
implications with data from the Libor benchmark setting process. We demonstrate that in
normal market conditions “cheap talk” announcements by banks about their financing costs
can credibly convey non-verifiable information and improve the functioning of the “over the
counter” interbank markets. We think that this is a reasonably realistic model of how Libor
worked in the early days. In particular it explains why, until the advent of the crisis, the
surprisingly informal Libor setting mechanism largely produced reliable numbers.
Benchmark setting mechanisms based on cheap talk are, however, fragile. If panel members
have additional reasons to understate their borrowing costs, the truth revealing equilibrium
collapses. As is common for cheap talk models, in this case banks can only credibly convey
some information by using a coarse signalling space, i.e. a signal space that is divided into
intervals of a certain size. Our model provides a lower bound for the length of these intervals
and shows that the length increases with a bank’s default probability and the liquidity of the
interbank market. We argue that submitting rounded numbers is a simple and intuitive way
to implement cheap talk equilibria with coarse signal spaces and provide evidence for patterns
of rounding that are consistent with this explication.
We hope that beyond the insight generated about the Libor process, our model will con-
45Our results also survive if duplicated submissions are removed from the sample.
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tribute to a deeper understanding of other market benchmarks and benchmark setting mech-
anisms. Market benchmarks are used in many illiquid OTC markets and the calculation of
benchmarks in these markets is based on a bewildering range of different mechanisms involving
past transactions, binding or partially binding quotes and pure cheap talk signals. Following
the Libor investigations a number of these other market benchmarks have come under the sus-
picion of manipulation.46 Our results should help reforming these benchmarks in a way that
preserves their efficiency enhancing properties.
46In addition to interest rate benchmarks such as ISDAfix, RONIA and SONIA foreign exchange bench-
marks such as the WM/Reuters FX rates as well as commodity benchmarks such as the Gold/Silver Fixings
and energy benchmarks such as the Platts, ICIS and Argus have recently come under investigation.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Eq. (3) means that the lender’s optimality is equivalent to:
e−λ(m,b) (1− µ(b,m)) b ≤ U, ∀m ∈ M, b ≥ 0, (12)
for some U ∈ R+, with equality in the support of P . For any m in the support of QM, (m, b)
belongs to the support of P if and only if λ(m, ·) is strictly increasing at b. Thus, a simple
algebraic rearrangement of (12) implies that the lender’s optimality is equivalent to:
λ(m, b) ≥ ln
(1− µ(b,m)) b
U
, ∀m ∈ M, b ≥ 0, (13)
with equality at any point in which λ(m, ·) is strictly increasing in b. The only function λ
satisfying this condition and λ(m, 0) = 0, and that it is also non-negative, continuous and
increasing in b is:















, ∀m ∈ M, b ≥ 0. (14)
We require that λ(m, 0) = 0, and that λ(m, ·) is non-negative, continuous and increasing
because it is a cumulative distribution function with support in R+ and no atoms.
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where the first step uses (7), the second step uses that:
(1− µ(b̂, m))b̂ ≤
∫ v
b̂




the third step uses Jensen’s inequality, the fourth step uses the law of iterated expectations,
and the fifth step uses the assumption in (4).
Next, we argue that the value of λ defined in the statement of the lemma is equal to the
value in (14) for U = u∗(Q). This is because u∗(Q) < v means that µ(u∗(Q),m) = 0, and thus,
the right hand side of (14) at U = u∗(Q) is equal to zero for b < u∗(Q) and to the right hand
side of (6) for b ≥ u∗(Q).
Finally, our last step is to note that (7) means that U = u∗(Q) solves the equation resulting




b̃ means that there







Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We take a message m and a lower message m′ whose respective pooling intervals have
lower bounds v and v′ and prove the first item by contradiction: A bank with type v has strict
incentives to deviate and report m′ instead of m if the difference v − v′ lies between zero and
the proposed bound. This is a direct consequence of the observation that (8) is a lower bound


























































inf |w′(x)| · eβ ·
v2
vη2
− (v − v′)
)
.
In the first step, we use three arguments. First,
∫
w(ṽ)dµ(ṽ, m) ≤ w(v) since w is a decreasing















in the support [v′, v]
first order stochastically dominates the distribution µ(·,m′), see (5) and note that its support
is [v′, v̂] for some v̂ ≤ v. And third, we use that the last integral can be simplified applying






, the infimum of the derivative
of w and that b̃ ≥ v. In the third step, we just compute the integrals and take a common factor.
In the fourth step, we use that u∗(Q) ≤ v
eβ
that can be deduced from (7). 
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We prove the proposition by showing that there exists an interval partition equilibrium
in which the range of Q has finitely many messages whose pooling intervals are of size smaller
than (2). Since sup |w′(v)| ≤ v
2
2v2η4
implies that pooling intervals of size less than (2) meet
the condition in (C2) we are going to restrict attention to equilibria in which (C2) is satisfied.
The communication strategy Q can be described by the set of (decreasing) bounds of the
corresponding pooling intervals, that we denote by {vi}
n
i=0 for v0 = v and vn = v, and a
labelling convention for the messages. We shall use that a necessary and sufficient condition
for the banks’ optimality condition is that a bank with type vi is indifferent between reporting
the message corresponding to the pooling interval [vi+1, vi] and the message corresponding to
the pooling interval [vi, vi−1]. This is a consequence of the fact that the derivative of the
bank’s payoff function (2) with respect to v weakly increases with larger messages (i.e. it is
supermodular in (m, v)). Formally, our necessary and sufficient condition can be deduced from
(5) and (8) to be:
















db̃ = 0, (16)
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
To show that our required solution exists, we show that ∆(vi+1, vi, vi−1) crosses zero as we
vary vi+1. First, we apply the bounds derived in (15) to conclude that:
∆(vi+1, vi, vi−1) > 0, if vi − vi+1 < δ ≡ inf |w










and u∗(Q) ≥ v
eβ
, by (7), means that the right hand side of (16) is
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less than:
sup |w′(x)| · η2 ·
(∫ vi
vi+1

















(vi − b̃) db̃













To give a sign to this expression, we note that the last line has the same sign as:
κ(δi + δi−1)− δ
2
i ,
for δi ≡ vi − vi+1, δi−1 ≡ vi−1 − vi and κ ≡ sup |w
′(x)| · eβ · v
2η2
v
. The application of the formula














The second term is positive and the first term is strictly less than (2κ− δi) if δi−1 < 2κ. Hence:
∆(vi+1, vi, vi−1) < 0, if vi − vi+1 > δ ≡ sup |w
′(x)| · eβ ·
2v2η2
v
> vi−1 − vi. (18)
The eqs. (17) and (18) imply that ∆(vi+1, vi, vi−1) moves from a strictly negative value to
a strictly positive value as vi+1 moves from vi − δ to vi − δ if vi−1 − vi < δ. Consequently, the
continuity of ∆ means that for any value of v1 ∈ (v−δ, v], we can define recursively the functions
νi+1(v1), i = 1, 2, . . ., as a solution in vi+1 ∈ (νi(v1)−δ, νi(v1)−δ] to ∆(vi+1, νi(v1), vi−1(v1)) = 0,





in v implies that ∆(vi+1, vi, vi−1)
is concave in vi+1. This implies that the functions νi are uniquely defined and, thus, continuous
in v1 since ∆ is also continuous. Another useful property of the functions νi, that we call (P1),
is that νi+1(v) = νi(ν2(v)) for i = 2, 3, . . . This property can be proved recursively using that
νi+1(v1) is the unique value that solves ∆(vi+1, νi(v1), vi−1(v1)) = 0, and that ν1(v1) = v1 and
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ν0(v1) = v.
We let n∗ be the maximum index i for which νi(v) is defined. This means that:
∆(v, νn∗−1(v), νn∗−2(v)) ≤ 0, (19)
and,
∆(v, νn∗(v), νn∗−1(v)) > 0. (20)
(20) and (P1) means that ∆(v, νn∗−1(ν2(v)), νn∗−2(ν2(v))) > 0, which together with (19) and
the continuity of νi and ∆ means that there exists a v
∗ ∈ (ν2(v), v] such that
∆(v, νn∗−1(v
∗), νn∗−2(v
∗)) = 0. (21)
This means that νn∗(v
∗) = v. Hence, we have found, as desired, a decreasing sequence
{v0, . . . , vn∗} = {ν0(v
∗), . . . , νn∗(v
∗)} that goes from v to v, that solves (16) and whose pooling
intervals vi − vi+1, i = 0, 1, . . . , n
∗ − 1, are less than δ. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Libor benchmark rates for all maturities. The first vertical line
indicates 31st of July 2007, when Bear Stearns’ High-Grade Structured Credit Fund col-
lapsed. The second vertical line indicates September 15th 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed
for bankruptcy.
46
Figure 2: Daily standard deviation of Libor quotes for each maturity. The first vertical line
indicates 31st of July 2007, when Bear Stearns’ High-Grade Structured Credit Fund col-
lapsed. The second vertical line indicates September 15th 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed
for bankruptcy.
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Figure 3: Daily submissions by BNP Paribas. The vertical line indicates April 2013, when
the Libor reform delayed the publication of individual submissions.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Frequencies of digits in the 2nd decimal of submissions corresponding to: CDS
spreads in the bottom quartile (a) and CDS spreads in the top quartile (b).
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Frequency of digits in the 2nd decimal of submissions for the overnight rate (a) and
the eight month rate (b).
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(a) (b)
Figure 6: Rounding per maturity for banks with CDS spreads in the bottom quartile (a)
and CDS spread in the top quartile (b). “1Y” stands for one year loans, “ON” stands for
overnight loans, “SW” for one week loans, “2W” for two weeks loans, and “xM” for x month
loans.
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Figure 7: 3 months moving average of rounding in the 2nd decimal for different banks.
The first vertical line indicates 31st of July 2007, when Bear Stearns’ High-Grade Struc-
tured Credit Fund collapsed. The second vertical line indicates September 15th 2008, when
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.
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Figure 8: 3 months moving average of rounding in the 2nd decimal for different maturities.
The first vertical line indicates 31st of July 2007, when Bear Stearns’ High-Grade Struc-
tured Credit Fund collapsed. The second vertical line indicates September 15th 2008, when
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.
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Note: This figure shows the evolution of the regression coefficient for the CDS spread when estimating equation
(11) for a 24 month interval surrounding the beginning of each quarter. The blue area indicates two-way
clustered standard errors at bank and day and at the 10% significance level. The regression is estimated without
interaction term and with bank fixed effects but without time controls and includes only data for maturities
that survive the 2013 reform. CDS spreads are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. “Reference Tenor”
is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the submission is for the overnight (“ON”), three month
(“3M”), six month (“6M”) or one year (“1Y”) tenors and 0, otherwise. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Figure 9: Evolution of the Relationship between Risk and Rounding.
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Note: This figure shows the evolution of regressions coefficients for liquid maturities, when estimating equation
(11) for a moving 24 month interval surrounding the beginning of each quarter. The blue area indicates two-way
clustered standard errors at bank and day and at the 10% significance level. The regression is estimated without
interaction term and with bank fixed effects but without time controls and includes only data for maturities
that survive the 2013 reform. CDS spreads are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Liquid maturities are
measured with the indicator variable “Reference Tenor” that takes the value of 1 if the submission is for the
overnight (“ON”), three month (“3M”), six month (“6M”) or one year (“1Y”) tenors and 0, otherwise. Data
are winsorized at the 99% level to remove outliers. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Figure 10: Evolution of the Relationship between Liquidity and Rounding.
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Table 1: Submissions from US-✩ Libor panel banks on October 10th, 2006.
Banks ON SW 2W 1M 2M 3M 4M 5M 6M 7M 8M 9M 10M 11M 1Y
BAFX 5.29 5.31 5.32 5.33 5.36 5.37 5.37 5.37 5.37 5.365 5.365 5.36 5.35 5.345 5.34
BARL 5.3 5.31 5.32 5.32 5.35 5.38 5.38 5.38 5.39 5.385 5.385 5.38 5.37 5.36 5.35
BTML 5.29 5.32 5.32 5.33 5.35 5.38 5.38 5.38 5.39 5.38 5.37 5.37 5.36 5.36 5.35
CSBL 5.29 5.29 5.3 5.32 5.35 5.37 5.375 5.38 5.385 5.38 5.375 5.37 5.36 5.35 5.345
CTGL 5.29 5.3 5.31 5.32 5.35 5.375 5.375 5.38 5.385 5.38 5.37 5.36 5.35 5.34 5.34
DBBL 5.3 5.3 5.31 5.32 5.345 5.375 5.385 5.395 5.39 5.385 5.38 5.375 5.365 5.355 5.345
HSBL 5.28 5.32 5.32 5.32 5.35 5.37 5.38 5.38 5.39 5.38 5.38 5.37 5.36 5.35 5.34
JPML 5.29 5.3 5.31 5.32 5.35 5.37 5.38 5.38 5.39 5.38 5.37 5.37 5.36 5.35 5.35
LOYL 5.27 5.3 5.31 5.32 5.35 5.37 5.38 5.38 5.39 5.38 5.38 5.37 5.36 5.36 5.35
NORL 5.31 5.31 5.32 5.33 5.35 5.37 5.38 5.39 5.395 5.395 5.39 5.38 5.37 5.36 5.35
RABO 5.31 5.31 5.31 5.32 5.35 5.375 5.38 5.395 5.385 5.385 5.38 5.38 5.37 5.36 5.35
RBCL 5.295 5.3 5.305 5.32 5.35 5.375 5.375 5.38 5.39 5.385 5.38 5.375 5.365 5.355 5.345
RBSL 5.28 5.29 5.29 5.32 5.35 5.365 5.385 5.375 5.385 5.375 5.375 5.37 5.36 5.35 5.35
UBSL 5.3 5.31 5.315 5.32 5.35 5.37 5.38 5.39 5.39 NA 5.385 5.375 5.365 5.36 5.35
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Table 2: Submissions from Libor panel banks on October 10th, 2008.
Banks ON SW 2W 1M 2M 3M 4M 5M 6M 7M 8M 9M 10M 11M 1Y
BAFX 2 5 5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.37 4.33 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
BARL 3 5 5 5 5.05 5.1 4.95 4.8 4.65 4.65 4.6 4.6 4.55 4.55 4.5
BTML 2.5 4.75 4.75 4.85 4.85 5.1 4.85 4.75 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.27 4.23 4.2
CSBL 2.5 5 5 5 5 5 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.35 4.3 4.25 4.23 4.21 4.2
CTGL 1.65 4.65 4.7 4.5 4.55 4.6 4.55 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.05 4.02 4
DBBL 2.5 4.3 4.35 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.5 4.3 4.25 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
HSBL 3.75 4 4 4.25 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.17 4.14 4.1 4.07 4.04 4
JPML 1.5 3.75 3.75 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.1 4 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.75
LOYL 2.75 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.35 4.55 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.17 4.14 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
NORL 2.25 5 5 4.7 4.7 4.85 4.5 4.55 4.4 4.35 4.25 4.2 4.22 4.18 4.15
RABO 1.5 3.5 3.75 4 4 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05
RBCL 2.25 4.8 4.8 4.55 4.7 4.8 4.65 4.5 4.4 4.37 4.34 4.32 4.32 4.41 4.3
RBSL 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.65 4.85 4.95 4.85 4.75 4.65 4.6 4.55 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
UBSL 2 4.75 4.7 4.65 4.73 4.85 4.66 4.55 4.45 NA 4.35 4.3 4.28 4.26 4.25
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Table 3: Risk, Liquidity and Rounding in Libor Submissions
Dependent variable: “Rounding in the 2nd Decimal”
Annual time controls Daily time controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CDS spread 1.802∗∗ 1.521∗∗ 0.449 0.427 0.177
(0.715) (0.646) (0.696) (0.846) (0.798)
p = 0.012 p = 0.019 p = 0.520 p = 0.614 p = 0.825
Liquid Maturities 0.035∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
CDS spread x Liquid Maturities 0.601∗∗ 0.536∗
(0.289) (0.301)
p = 0.038 p = 0.075
Daily mean CDS spread 3.183∗∗∗
(0.733)
p = 0.000
Time controls: Annual Annual Annual Daily Daily
Bank fixed effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 489,158 489,158 489,158 489,158 489,158
R2 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.098 0.098
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.093 0.093
Residual Std. Error 0.395 (df = 489128) 0.395 (df = 489127) 0.395 (df = 489126) 0.387 (df = 486585) 0.387 (df = 486584)
Note: This table provides the results of regressing coarseness in Libor submissions on proxies for risk and
liquidity. Models (1), (2) and (3) include time controls at annual frequency. Models (4) and (5) are estimated
with full time fixed effects with daily frequency. “Rounding in the 2nd Decimal” is a dummy variable taking
the value 1 if the second and last decimal of the Libor submission is either “5” or “0”. “CDS Spread” is the
spread on the bank’s one year senior Credit Default Swap, “Daily mean CDS Spread” is the daily average of
“CDS Spread” and “Liquid Maturities” is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the submission is for
one of the tenors that remained after the 2013 reform. Standard errors are two-way clustered at bank and time
level. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4: Liquidity and Rounding for reference rates and surrounding tenors
Dependent variable: “Rounding in the 2nd Decimal”
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ON/SW 2M/3M/4M 5M/6M/7M 11M/1Y
CDS spread 3.120∗∗∗ 1.033∗ 1.280 1.033∗
(1.031) (0.609) (0.848) (0.609)
p = 0.003 p = 0.091 p = 0.131 p = 0.091
Reference Tenors 0.045∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ −0.003 0.029∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
p = 0.017 p = 0.002 p = 0.655 p = 0.002
Time controls Annual Annual Annual Annual
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 57,538 87,537 85,452 58,362
R2 0.205 0.160 0.126 0.132
Adjusted R2 0.175 0.139 0.103 0.099
Residual Std. Error 0.419 (df = 55419) 0.375 (df = 85418) 0.377 (df = 83333) 0.381 (df = 56243)
Note: This table provides the results of regressing rounding in Libor submissions on CDS spreads and
liquidity for subsamples including each a reference rate and the surrounding less liquid tenors. In regression
(1) we only include the overnight and single week tenor. The sample for (2) comprises the two, three and four
month rates, (3) analyzes the five, six and seven month rates and (4) the eleven month and one year rates.
“Rounding in the 2nd Decimal” is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the second and last decimal of the Libor
submission is either “5” or “0”. “CDS Spread” is the spread on the bank’s one year senior Credit Default Swap
and “Reference Tenor” is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the submission is for the overnight
(“ON”), three month (“3M”), six month (“6M”) and one year (“1Y”) tenor and 0, otherwise. Standard errors
are clustered at the bank and time level. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
59
